Iraq and Kosovo as Viewed by Op-Ed Columnists

Iraq and Kosovo as Viewed by Op-Ed Columnists

John J. McTague

St. Leo University

In the run up to the March, 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq, the airwaves and newspaper columns in this country were filled with invective, primarily voiced by conservative politicians and pundits, directed against those who opposed this preemptive war. The general tone of these charges was such that anyone who disagreed with the Administration’s decision to attack Saddam Hussein was regarded as unpatriotic. Four years earlier, while Democrat Bill Clinton was in the White House, he initiated a campaign in Kosovo against Serbia. Surprisingly, some of the Republican politicians who later had been fervently in support of Bush’s war in Iraq led the opposition to Clinton’s campaign.

The most egregious example of a hypocritical politician is House Majority Leader Tom Delay, who last spring questioned Senator John Kerry’s patriotism despite the fact that Kerry was a decorated Vietnam War veteran, while the Texas Congressman had never served a day in uniform. Back in April 1999, Delay actively opposed a House resolution to support the war in Kosovo, and partly due to his efforts, it failed by a 213-213 vote. One commentator noted that “in his floor speech Delay was kinder to [Serbian leader Slobodan] Milosovic than he was to Clinton”.[1]

This author concluded that it would be a fascinating project to survey the major op-ed columnists, who primarily work for the New York Times and the Washington Post, in order to compare their views of the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns. Did the columnists support both wars? Did they oppose both? Did they defend one war and not the other? And, most importantly, what were the arguments which they employed to support their positions?

For the purposes of this paper, the columnists had to have written more than an occasional piece on each war. For example, the Times’ Anthony Lewis and Abe Rosenthal both wrote extensively on Kosovo but both had retired by the time of the Iraq campaign. And that newspaper’s Maureen Dowd has written numerous columns on Iraq but had little to say about Clinton’s war in the Balkans. Even so, we found ten op-ed writers who produced a sufficient number of pieces to qualify. Among these are the Post’s George Will, E.J. Dionne, Jim Hoagland, Richard Cohen, Charles Krauthammer and William Raspberry, the Times’ William Safire and Tom Friedman, and the editorial boards of both papers.

Of these ten journalists, six supported both the Kosovo and Iraq campaigns. The journalists were: Will, Hoagland, Cohen, Safire, Friedman and the Post’s editorial page. Only Raspberry opposed both, while Krauthammer, Dionne and the Times’ editorial page alternated between viewpoints. Krauthammer supported Iraq but not Kosovo, while Dionne and the Times did the opposite.

This writer was especially curious to see what stances the major conservative columnists such as Safire, Will and Krauthammer, who all strongly supported Bush on Iraq, had taken on Kosovo.[2] This campaign began in March, 1999, only two months after Clinton’s impeachment trial, and Republican anger at the president was at a fever pitch. Would that anger infect their views on a war conducted for supposedly moral reasons by a president who had admitted to carrying on an affair with an intern in the White House and lying about it to the American people?

In the cases of Safire and Will it did not. Safire’s columns consistently supported the campaign in Kosovo and in fact chastised Clinton primarily for being too timid in restricting NATO to an air war. He feared that the president would not pursue the war vigorously enough because of fear of casualties and he even criticized some Republicans for their lack of support. Then he praised Sen. John McCain for having the courage to call for a ground war despite the deaths that would inevitably cause.[3] As the war wound down in June he gave it a ringing endorsement: “The right thing was to place humanity’s resistance to barbarism above national sovereignty. When a nation commits a mass atrocity against a segment of its own people, other nations have just asserted their right to intervene with force.”[4] This was consistent with some of his later arguments in support of the invasion of Iraq.

Likewise, George Will supported the Kosovo war but frequently criticized what he regarded as a half-hearted (no ground troops) effort to win.[5] He argued that “Serbia’s atrocities are not genocide─a campaign to exterminate an entire category of people─but they are patent war crimes.”[6] For that reason, he felt that Milosovic would have to be completely removed from any control in Kosovo for the war to be considered a success. And he, even more than Safire, chastised Republicans for playing politics with the war: “Republicans seem determined to do nothing─certainly not their duties, constitutional and others─that might make this seem like something other than the Clinton-Gore war ... But most Congressional Republicans seem to see only a chance for electoral advantage.”[7]

But if Safire and Will were consistent in their arguments about the two campaigns, the same cannot be said for Krauthammer. His support for the war in Iraq was unwavering. He ridiculed chief UN weapons inspector Hans Blix, calling Blix, “neither strong nor determined...instead he is running a farce”, that the UN itself was “... on the verge of demonstrating finally and fatally its moral bankruptcy and its strategic irrelevance”, and “if it fails, you’ve exposed the UN for what it is: the League of Nations, empty, cynical, mendacious”; plus France, Russia, China and any other nation that opposed US policy.[8] His exasperation with any organization or nation that opposed Bush’s policy was exemplified in one column by the statement (in reference to the UN vote in March which was never held): “Mr. President: call the vote and walk away”.[9]

However, four years earlier he stated some very different arguments as the Kosovo war unfolded. A month before the campaign began he stood out against it on the grounds that “... this would not be NATO going to the defense of a country invaded. This would be NATO actually invading a sovereign country, Yugoslavia.”[10] Yet that qualm did not bother him in the case of Iraq. Later in the same article he complained that “at this point its (the Clinton Administration’s) attempt to inflate the stakes has become almost comical.”[11] That was exactly the argument made by critics of the Iraq war, although no one uses the word “comical” to describe the Bush team’s exaggerated claims about WMD and ties to al-Qaeda.

As the aerial bombardment was about to start in late March, Krauthammer issued the sensible caveat that “it is not forgivable to send American men and women into battle in the name of a cause one can barely elucidate...When in doubt, play the Hitler card. No matter how ridiculous the analogy ... Its (Serbia’s) objective is merely to retain sovereignty over a province that has been Yugoslavia’s ... since 1918.”[12] It is important note that just three years later Iraq came into existence by virtue of a British mandate, and was led by King Faisal I.

Shortly after that column, Krauthammer penned another in which he complained that Clinton, not Milosovic, was endangering the lives of Kosovars. The journalist asserted that the war was ruining diplomatic relations with Russia and China, two countries he condemned four years later for their lack of cooperation with Bush.[13] Then, incredibly, a week later he reversed course and demanded that NATO hit Serbia harder: “Finally they are hitting targets─power plants, fuel depots, bridges, airports, TV transmitters─that may indeed kill the enemy and civilians nearby. Those who, like me, opposed this campaign from the start can only applaud this dawning of seriousness, because it provides the only possible way out of this war short of abject defeat.”[14]

His seemingly irrational desire to attack Clinton reached its peak over his criticism of the lack of NATO and American casualties (no Americans died during the entire 100-day campaign): “If the commander-in-chief does not have the courage to send soldiers to die, he has no business getting into this or any other war.”[15] Yet, unlike Safire and Will, he had no comment whatsoever about the refusal of Congressional Republican leaders to support the war. He then inaccurately predicted that Clinton would accept a settlement short of his expressed goals, which were a total Serb withdrawal from Kosovo and its replacement with NATO forces, plus the return of all Kosovar refugees.[16] He never acknowledged this mistake in later columns.

When the war ended in June he petulantly referred to it as a hollow victory, complaining about too many casualties among the Kosovars (he never refers to the thousands of Iraqis that have died in the current war) and lamenting that the US would now have to police a dangerous territory.[17] Again, he has not made the same criticism of the occupation of Iraq.

Yet in March, 2003, in one of his columns supporting the Iraq campaign, he finally admitted that the war in Kosovo had been “just”.[18]

In the interest of objectivity, it is only fair to examine the other two inconsistent writers, Post columnist E.J. Dionne and the Times editorial board. They both took the contrary position, supporting Kosovo but opposing Iraq. Dionne seems to have based his views on the different motivations for the two wars. On the subject of Kosovo, he wrote, shortly after the bombing began, that “the brutality of Milosovic’s forces now gives us little choice but to fight on until Kosovars regain security in their own land.”[19] In several other pieces he took Republicans to task for their failure to give Clinton support and, when the war ended in June, he wrote a triumphant column calling the campaign a success and rejoicing that Clinton-haters had lost once again.[20]

But, while he readily accepted the need for war in Kosovo, he was much more skeptical about Iraq. A little more than a month before the campaign began he argued:

... if the war is only about weapons of mass destruction, then the doubters can keep arguing, plausibly, that as long as the inspectors are on the ground with the threat of force behind them, Hussein will be kept in a box and unable to threaten anybody...In particular, the Administration’s relentless effort to insist on some link between Hussein and al-Qaeda, no matter what the facts showed at a given time, looks more like a public relations stunt than an honest effort to establish the truth.[21]

He expressed his doubts in another way several weeks later by commenting “it’s hard to escape the feeling that those who always wanted to finish the last Gulf War by getting rid of Hussein are using the events of September 11, 2001 as a rationale for doing what they wanted to do on Sept. 10, 2001.”[22] Later, he commented on the reasons why there arose so much worldwide opposition to the war in Iraq, which he argued “reflect fears that the US is going to war not just to rid Hussein of weapons but on behalf of a grand theory. The theory sees unfettered American power as capable of remaking the world. That’s certainly bold. It’s also dangerous.”[23] After the fall of Baghdad, Dionne congratulated Bush on the victory but noted that the decade-long policy of containment and sanctions had kept Saddam so weak that he was incapable of resisting and expressed worries about the postwar period, which as we all know has been difficult, to say the least.[24]

The Times editorial board took positions similar to Dionne’s. They backed the campaign in Kosovo from start to finish. Early on they argued, “NATO should not undertake bombing casually, especially to change the way a government treats its own citizens. But in this case, NATO must be united in carrying out its threat. If Mr. Milosovic does not immediately stop attacking ethnic Albanians and agree to the peace plan, bombing is the appropriate response.”[25] In fact, they pushed for an escalation of the campaign in the early stages, although never supporting the idea of introducing ground troops.[26]

When Milosovic capitulated in June, the Times editorial board wrote two celebratory pieces. The first one opined that “...the most dangerous military conflict in Europe since the Second World War will conclude as a victory for the principles of democracy and human rights ...The sustained bombing has been more effective than many critics allowed, and for the most part was conducted with restraint and a proper regard for civilian casualties.”[27]

The second boasted that “it is not too soon to conclude that the air offensive was just, and more effective than many critics expected ... it demonstrated that the U.S. and its allies can act decisively in defense of democratic principles and against ethnic violence in Europe.”[28] But it did caution that in the future such campaigns should not be undertaken without the approval of the UN Security Council and Congress, neither of which had given its support to the Kosovo campaign. That absence of Security Council approval became one of the newspaper’s main reasons for opposing the war in Iraq.

While they accepted Clinton’s rationale for his campaign in 1999, four years later the Times editors regularly found fault with arguments put forth by the Bush Administration. They consistently advised the President to give the UN inspectors more time to find “Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and they worried that going to war without broad international support would be dangerous.[29] They accepted the concept that Iraq had to be disarmed but warned, “... all chances of doing so peacefully should be explored before the world is asked to decide on war.”[30] One of their liveliest pieces, published in January, 2003, cautioned: “To go it alone, or nearly alone, is to court disaster ... There are some threats and some causes that require fighting even if America has to fight alone, but this isn’t one of them.”[31]

Even after Secretary of State Colin Powell’s famous presentation to the Security Council in February, 2003, the Times editors remained unconvinced that Iraq posed a serious threat to the US or that Saddam had links to al-Qaeda.[32] However, they did begin to criticize France by arguing that they “...must cease acting as if the real problem were to contain the US,” and other European nations for not being tougher on Saddam.[33] When war came, the Times editors did not support it. On 17 March they commented, “this page remains persuaded of the vital need to disarm Iraq. But it is a process that should go through the UN ...The current path is reckless.”[34] The following day they argued that: “at a time when America most needs the world to see its actions in the best possible light, they will probably be seen in the worst.”[35]

In mid-November they published a major editorial looking back on the war and their criticisms of it. Considering the fact that no WMD have been found and no credible evidence of links to al-Qaeda have been uncovered, added to the fact that the postwar period has gone so badly, they found their own position still valid.[36] Only a few days later, Safire wrote his own retrospective on Iraq entitled “Mistakes Were Made.” Of the ten mistakes he discussed, five were by critics of the war and four were by the Administration and its supporters. But, like the Times editorial board, he held fast to his original position: “Mistakes will be made in winning this war. But advancing freedom is never a mistake.”[37]

One of the columnists under review, Richard Cohen of the Post, changed his opinion by the end of the year. He had supported the war, albeit reluctantly, in most of his pieces in the spring, primarily on the grounds that Saddam was a menace that would have to be dealt with someday: “...while war is bad─very, very bad─sometimes peace is no better, especially if all it does is postpone a worse war. That’s what would happen if the US now pulled back.”[38] But by November he had become badly disillusioned by the fact that Bush’s accusations about WMD and ties to al-Qaeda had failed to be borne out. He argued that maybe this was the result of an intelligence failure, and if so, he deemed it “massive and inexcusable.”[39] He went on to propose that:

The other possibility is that they─the top people in the Bush administration─knew the stated grounds for war were bogus. If that’s the case, then we do not have a thrilling exercise in presidential power but an abuse that makes Watergate look as trivial as Richard Nixon’s defenders said it was ... It is possible─actually more than possible─that a clique of defense intellectuals either snookered the president into going to war or did so with his full cooperation. If this was done, then it represents a grave and reprehensible breach of faith with the American people.[40]

The only columnist who opposed both wars was Post columnist William Raspberry. His arguments against Iraq were similar to those mentioned earlier in this paper and his criticism of the Kosovo war was based on his fear of a quagmire, the lack of an exit strategy, and the belief that negotiations would accomplish more than bombing, which he viewed as counter-productive.[41] Of all the columnists surveyed, he appeared to be the most reluctant to use war as an instrument of national policy.

In examining the various opinions expressed, some conclusions can be drawn. An important conclusion is that the war in Kosovo was justified while the one in Iraq was not. While this may appear to be inconsistent, several points need to be made by way of explanation: 1. Reasons for War─The primary justification for the Kosovo campaign was to prevent ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by Milosovic. While this was not a matter of national security for the US, it was clearly an issue of human rights, particularly since the world community had permitted such slaughter in Bosnia and Rwanda only a few years before. Moreover, this ethnic cleansing was not a matter of speculation but verifiable. On the contrary, the justifications for attacking Iraq were either atrocities from the 1980s or early 1990s (gassing Kurds, invading Iran and Kuwait) or unproven actions such as possession of WMD and links with al-Qaeda. Saddam’s real threat to national security appears to have been greatly exaggerated.

2. International Cooperation─The war in Kosovo was conducted as a NATO operation with the full cooperation of all major US allies. The only opposition came from Russia, a traditional ally of the Serbs, and China, after the accidental bombing of its embassy in Belgrade. The Iraq campaign was carried on with a “coalition of the willing” without either NATO or UN support and even governments that joined the war─Britain, Spain and Italy─did so despite public disapproval of the war. Long-time allies such as France and Germany stood in opposition.

3. Goals─The goals of the Kosovo campaign were far more limited than in Iraq, which made international cooperation easier to obtain. NATO aimed only to drive Serb forces out of the province so as to allow the Albanian refugees to return and be able to live in peace and security. No attempt to invade Serbia or topple Milosovic was contemplated. The postwar occupation involved only Kosovo itself, and that business was turned over to the UN. No Americans died during the entire campaign, in contrast to the steadily growing body count in Iraq.

For all of these reasons, the conclusion of this paper is that Kosovo was a far more acceptable application of US military force than Iraq has proven to be. The arguments for going to war were clear and verifiable, and did not shift during the course of the campaign. The Kosovo intervention was not viewed around the world as a unilateral action, despite the lack of a UN mandate, and as a consequence did not arouse international ire as the war in Iraq has done. Additionally, the goals of the action in the Balkans were far more limited, thus making it easier for the world to accept. The fact that the engagement lasted for a mere one hundred days was a factor as well. It was too brief for opposition to develop any momentum, the way it did in Vietnam and now Iraq. Consequently, Kosovo is not as likely to be as closely compared as those two wars.

[1] Washington Post (WP) editorial 30 April, 1999; E.J. Dionne, WP, 3 May, 1999, A25.

[Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians, Annual Meeting, 2004,]

[2] Safire, New York Times (NYT), 20 January, 2003, A17; 30 January, 2003, A23; 16 February, 2003, A39; 3 November, 2003, A21; Will, WP, 2 February, 2003, B7; 6 February, 2003, A37; 13 March, 2003, A23; Krauthammer, WP, 10 January, 2003, A21; 24 January, 2003, A27; 31 January, 2003, A27; 12 March, 2003, A21l 21 March, 2003, A37.

[3] NYT, 1 April, 1999, A28; 5 April, 1999, A21; 22 April, 1999, A31.

[4] NYT, 7 June, 1999, A23.

[5] WP, 4 April, 1999, B7; 14 April, 1999, A27; 22 April, 1999, A27; 27 May, 1999, A39.

[6] WP, 30 March, 1999, A17.

[7] WP, 29 April, 1999, A33.

[8] WP, 10 January, 2003, A21; 31 January, 2003, A27; 12 March, 2003, A21; 21 March, 2003, A37.

[9] WP, 12 March, 2003, A21.

[10] WP, 26 February, 1999, A27.

[11] Ibid.

[12] WP, 26 March, 1999, A33.

[13] WP, 2 April, 1999, A29.

[14] WP, 8 April, 1999, A31.

[15] WP, 23 April, 1999, A37.

[16] WP, 28 April, 1999, A25.

[17] WP, 11 June, 1999, A37.

[18] WP, 12 March, 2003, A21.

[19] WP, 6 April, 1999, A23.

[20] WP, 9 April, 1999, A37; 3 May, 1999, A25; 11 June, 1999, A37.

[21] WP, 31 January, 2003, A37.

[22] WP, 18 February, 2003, A25.

[23] WP, 11 March, 2003, A23.

[24] WP, 11 April, 2003, A27.

[25] NYT, 18 March, 1999, A24.

[26] NYT, 25 March, 1999, A30; 26 March, 1999, A22; 15 April, 1999, A30.

[27] NYT, 4 June, 1999, A28.

[28] NYT, 17 June, 1999, A30.

[29] NYT, 2 January, 2003, A16; 5 January, 2003, 4-10.

[30] NYT, 10 January, 2003, A22.

[31] NYT, 26 January, 2003, 4-12.

[32] NYT, 6 February, 2003, A38.

[33] NYT, 13 February, 2003, A40; 15 February, 2003, A24; 25 February, 2003, A28.

[34] NYT, 17 March, 2003, A22.

[35] NYT, 18 March, 2003, A32.

[36] NYT, 16 November, 2003, 4-12.

[37] NYT, 19 November, 2003, A29.

[38] WP, 23 January, 2003, A21; 6 February, 2003, A37; 11 March, 2003, A23; 18 March, 2003, A29.

[39] WP, 25 November, 2003, A29.

[40] Ibid.

[41] WP, 25 March, 1999, A37; 3 April, 1999, A15; 21 May, 1999, A31; 24 May, 1999, A25; 6 January, 2003, A15; 3 February, 2003, A23; 10 February, 2003, A21; 24 February, 2003, A13, 14 April, 2003, A17.