Hitler’s Ideological Foot-Soldiers:

3.96 million inhabitants, were Polish, with a German minority of seven percent, consisting of a mere 327,000 persons.[3] The task of ‘germanizing’ the incorporated territories was assumed by Reichsführer SS Heinrich Himmler, who promptly styled himself the head of the Reich Commission for the Strengthening of German Folkdom (Reichskommissariate für die Festigung deutschen Volkstums - RKFDV).[4]

Himmler viewed the roughly 10 million ethnic Germans, or Volksdeutsche, living in Europe, but outside of Germany’s borders, as cultural fertilizer useful primarily for the expanding Nazi state. These persons were to be brought “home into the Reich” (“Heim ins Reich”) and used to repopulate the incorporated territories with German blood. Jews, and those Poles who were without ‘Germanic’ characteristics, or who were not needed for slave labor, were to be driven out. This process began on 15 October, 1939, with the conclusion of a resettlement treaty with Estonia, followed by similar treaties with Latvia and the Soviet Union on 30 October and 3 November respectively. By the end of January, 1940, almost 190,000 Volksdeutsche had answered the Führer’s call, with even more on the way.[5]

The center of this Nazi resettlement scheme was the city of Lodz (renamed Litzmannstadt by the Nazis in Spring, 1940), which was located in the Reichsgau Wartheland. The majority of the new ‘German’ settlers were processed in one of three massive transit camps located in and around the city, which were run by the Ethnic German Liaison Office (Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle – VoMi). By mid-1941, nearly 500,000 Volksdeutsche had entered the expanded Reich, 300,000 of which were allocated to the Warthegau. Regardless of the partial resettlement, less than 1/10 of these immigrants were immediately settled, and roughly 9/10 remained in the internment camps. Thousands of settlers sat in these camps for a year or more awaiting placement in confiscated Polish homes.[6]

The lengthy delay in settling these German immigrants must not solely be attributed to the difficulties involved in the physical expulsion of the Poles from their homes. It also occurred because of the difficulty of sifting the German ‘wheat’ from the East European ‘chaff’. Each settler was expected to undergo a lengthy series of examinations by the ‘racial assessors’ of the Race and Settlement Main Office (Rasse und Siedlungs-Hauptamt – RuSHA). In this way, only the best elements of the German nation would be utilized to form this German “community of the people” in the east, thereby creating a strong bulwark against Russian communism.

The taming of this newly conquered eastern “frontier” and the need to assimilate or indoctrinate these Volksdeutsche with Nazi political and social values opened up a plethora of new opportunities for Reich-born Germans in the east. As Ernst Wagemann, the President of the German Institute for Economic Research proclaimed (as a modified Horace Greeley): “Today Europe’s future lay no longer over the seas, but in that great space that starts beyond Vienna, Breslau, and Danzig and stretches deep into the Asiatic continent. The way it looks, “Go east, young man” will be the watchword for ambitious talents for decades to come.”[7]

Nazi attitudes regarding a woman’s role in society categorized women as mothers, caregivers, and wives.[8] Although Wagemann only sought after opportunities for young men in the east, young women, especially young college women, played a significant role in the ‘germanization’ of the Polish frontier. The Nazi movement had a strong, though certainly not universal, appeal to German college students despite Hitler’s well-known anti-intellectual views.[9] This appeal arose from the action oriented nature of the Party, its regenerative nationalist message, as well as the Party’s early economic promises (and later success in helping to bring about an economic recovery from the Great Depression). In Summer, 1931 the German Students’ Union gained the dubious distinction of having become “the first national organization to surrender itself to Nazi control…a full eighteen months prior to Hitler becoming Chancellor.”[10] However, with the ongoing war, college-aged men who were not actively attending classes were expected to directly contribute to the war effort, usually through military service. Due to the absence of men, college women played a predominant role in the attempted assimilation of the Volksdeutsche.

The autobiographic account of Melita Maschmann provides a wealth of information regarding the actions of college women in the incorporated territories between 1939 and 1943.[11] Maschmann, a devoted Nazi Party member, was a leader of the Girl’s Branch of the Hitler Youth (Bund Deutscher Mädel – BDM). In November, 1939, Melita became the first Reich German BDM leader to be sent to the Warthegau, initially for the purpose of running the press department for the Regional Leadership of the Hitler Youth in Posen. She had accepted the position on a volunteer basis in order to further her education in journalism and editing.

Maschmann’s promotion was not at all unusual. Many German college students were provided with educational opportunities in the east as a strong incentive to participate in the Nazi occupation. Graduate student Theodorich Hartmann accepted a low-paying research assistant post at the Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit in Krakow in order to pursue a career in the field of land-use studies and to work on his dissertation.[12] Beginning in Summer, 1940, student work programs, such as those created by the SS Settlement Staff (SS-Ansiedlungsstab), allowed students to gain practical experience in their fields of study in the conquered territories of Poland.[13] During that first summer three medical students from Hamburg were sent to Lodz as student-interns. According to their reports from Lodz, the experience provided the students with a unique insight “into the many, often unsolved questions of modern mass migration.”[14] Participation in this SS program steadily increased from 800 students in 1940 to 2,500 participants by 1943.[15]

Beyond furthering one’s education, there was also the careerist promise of upward mobility in the east. Hitler spoke about the increase in career opportunities in May, 1942: “One attraction which will certainly appeal to the young is that by emigrating in this fashion they will find opportunities for promotion infinitely more rapid than those of their less enterprising comrades who remain quietly at home.”[16] Once conquered, Poland became wide open to aggressive young men and women looking for advancement opportunities, as the new eastern territories were frequently manpower deficient. This shortage of manpower was in part due to the chaotic command structure of overlapping party and state agencies under Nazi rule, and in part due to the severity of Nazi occupation policy against the Poles which resulted in the lack of Polish cooperation with Nazi ‘colonial’ rule. As a result, “the ratio of occupying German public employees, including post and railroad personnel, to non-Germans was 1:808 in 1940 and 1:333 in 1944. By way of comparison, 1:28,000 was the average ratio in British India; 1:27,000 in French West Africa; and 1:54,000 in British Nigeria. Only Japanese-occupied Korea came close…with a ratio of 1:420 during the mid-1930s.”[17] The ever-increasing demand for personnel in the east drew many young Germans to Poland in the hope of rapidly advancing their careers.

Another economic factor which acted as an incentive to draw Reich Germans to the “frontier,” had been the spoils of conquest. The cities of Poland were a German shopper’s paradise during the war. For example, as the war progressed, one could purchase two boxes of cigarettes in Poland for the cost of two cigarettes in Germany. Food was also in more plentiful supply for Germans in Poland than for those living in Germany proper. Prices were kept artificially low and food rations high to promote Reich-German colonization. Plus, for less reputable Germans, of which Poland received more than its fair share, there was always the promise of extortion or outright ‘confiscation’ of property.[18]

Still, for many, ideological reasons were equally as, if not more, important than these material concerns. To return to Melita Maschmann: while continuing her education and promoting her career were important factors in her decision to pursue opportunities in the east, Maschmann was also a Nazi idealist. She was one of that breed of ‘true believers’. ‘True believers’, as one colonial proponent characterized it, were those who had: “the will to go forth, for the Reich, into undeveloped regions and to transform the wilderness into civilized lands.”[19] Maschmann, like many others, viewed Germany’s expansion to the east as a redemptive action, by which Germany was recovering what had been forcibly taken from her during the First World War. The seizure of the incorporated territories seemed to have successfully demonstrated the superiority of German ingenuity, culture, and race, over backwards “Polish management.”[20]

The level of Nazi Party membership in Lodz gives some indication of the level of the general ideological commitment of those Germans active within the incorporated territories. According to a study by David Bruce Furber II, while only 16 percent of German civil servants in pre-1939 Germany were Nazi Party members, for the 340 German civil servants he analyzed in Lodz, party membership was an astounding 90 percent. Additionally, while less than 1 percent of Party members within Germany proper had joined the Party before Hitler’s assumption of power in 1933, 33 percent of the civil servants in the Warthegau were alter Kämpfer, ‘old fighters’, for the party.[21] While the level and length of Party membership are not precise ideological yardsticks, the figures do indicate above average support for the Party amongst the German occupiers of Poland.

According to Maschmann, it was this drive to support and spread Nazi ideology amongst the Volksdeutsche, which led her to abandon her position in Posen and to join the Women’s Labor Service’s ‘Eastern Venture’ camp movement.[22] In these Volksdeutsche settlements, female teenage German volunteers would act as teachers, counselors, settlement organizers, and in some cases as the de facto force of law. This was not an extremely popular form of student service, due to the relatively primitive conditions of the Polish villages, the six-month term of volunteer service, and the hard work and long hours involved in organizing these settlements for incoming ethnic Germans. However, those who served demonstrated that these women, who were acting as Nazi role models for the settlers, tended to be more ideologically motivated than the average German student. [23]

Maschmann’s first ‘Eastern Venture’ settlement, in the eastern reaches of the Warthegau, was only staffed by about a dozen young women. The eldest of the group, who also served as the camp leader, had been only twenty-three years old. These young women were granted a high degree of autonomy and responsibility within these camps. When Maschmann took over the leadership of a camp in early 1942, the only other Germans initially present in the village—beyond her twelve female counselor-teachers—were the Amtskomissar, his deputy, two policemen, the postmaster and their families. As this village had not yet been resettled, this handful of administrators and thirteen girls were responsible for maintaining control over a Polish village of over 2,000 persons.[24]

Normally, in such a situation, the Central Emigration Office (Umwandererzentralstelle: UWZ), originally known as the “Office for the Resettlement of Poles and Jews,” would coordinate the removal of these Poles with the local police force. The UWZ and police would then descend on the targeted village during the wee hours of the morning with a list of evacuees—those Poles considered not being ethnically German or who did not possess vital skills the Nazis required. These deportees would be given an hour to prepare (if that) and were

only allowed to bring one 25 to 30 kg suitcase of belongings, 8 to 14 days of food, and no more than 100 Reichsmarks. Everything else was to be left behind for the coming Volksdeutsche settlers.[25]

The normal responsibilities for the Labor Service women were to prepare the Polish houses for their next occupants, and to help the settlers adjust to their new surroundings. Most of the incoming ethnic Germans were illiterate. Many who arrived from the Baltic States, various regions of Poland, or other areas of Eastern Europe, did not speak the German language, or only spoke it as a second language. It was the responsibility of these women to establish a school curriculum for the incoming Volksdeutsche and, again, to act as counselors should the settlers need comfort or aid. In addition to their usual responsibilities, the women acted as cultural missionaries, establishing the social (and political) norms for the community. They sought to form a distinctly German melting pot in these communities by blending the various cultures and dialects of the settlers into a homogeneous Nazi Volksgemeinschaft (national community).

The Labor Service women acted as social standard-bearers before both their ethnic German charges and the remaining Polish population. Maschmann claimed in her autobiography that the Women’s Labor Service had “social-educational aims rather than political ones,” yet the establishment of Nazi social norms within these communities was a political goal of the Party.[26] For example, Maschmann and her fellow teacher-counselors constantly reinforced the social, and racial, divide between the Germans and the Poles. The large number of Poles, among them many Jews living within the Reich’s borders, and the thousands of ethnic Germans immigrating into these territories, increased the danger of fraternization with and sympathy for the subject peoples. Ethnic German immigrants who had not been subjected to intensive Nazi racial indoctrination and needed to be instructed in, and constantly reminded of, Nazi social norms. Racial indoctrination was a vital task for the German college students to perform. The German college students acted as the ideological foot-soldiers of the Nazi state.

Nazi fears of fraternization between the ethnic German settlers and the subject races of Poland were not unfounded. Nazi officials in the Wartheland soon came to realize that a large number of Polish deportees were returning there, even under the penalty of death. In some areas Baltic German families were living in “household communities” with Polish families who had hidden or for other reasons had not yet been deported. The Poles relied on the sympathy of the German settlers, and it was a gamble that they appeared to win more often than they lost. This was not a weakness solely belonging to the Volksdeutsche settlers. One member of the Volksdeutsche Mittlestelle, SS-Hauptsturmführer Schröder complained that his superior, SS-Gruppenführer Koppe was “too sentimental to stand a few rebellious Poles up against the wall [and shoot them].”[27]

These racial issues were the sort of ‘problems’ with which Maschmann was constantly confronted. An example from Melita’s journal epitomizes the racial difficulties:

The farmer’s wife is very familiar with the Polish maids. She fools about with them all day and allows them to keep kissing the child. The farmer…observed, when I remonstrated firmly that he should surely speak German in his own home, “German or Polish, it’s all the same to me.”[28]

One of the [Polish] maids…sings German songs all day. In a dreadful thick accent of course ... I have forbidden her to sing songs of this kind.[29]

Such statements indicate the lack of racial boundaries between the newly-settled ethnic Germans and Poles. Maschmann and her young colleagues actively promoted and enforced Nazi racial policy, creating a racial hierarchy which the Poles and Volksdeutsche were expected to adopt without question. However, this lesson was not merely confined to the Volksdeutsche and subject races of the east. These Reich-German ‘pioneers’ also helped to reinforce racial stereotypes at home via their letters and press statements from the “primitive” eastern frontier. For example, the filthy conditions found in Polish homes upon their evacuation for settlement were often used as examples of ‘Polish management’, a sign of Polish primitiveness. However, this was likely a form of protest by the Poles against those forcing them from their homes and lands.

As a more direct expression of Nazi racial policy being put into action by these students, Polish/Jewish forced labor squads were often used to repair Polish cottages and roads, and for other duties in preparation for ethnic German settlement. In some cases, German students actively participated in the evacuations of Polish/Jewish villages. Maschmann herself, along with her team of girls, participated in the evacuation of the Polish population in the first settlement under her command. According to Maschmann, some of her volunteers were “even a little eager for adventure.”[30] Faced with a product of such evacuations, the Jewish ghetto in Kutno, Maschmann had consoled herself with the belief that, “the driving out of the Jews is one of the unfortunate things we must bargain for if the ‘Warthegau’ is to become a German country.”[31]

While there were obviously a number of factors which influenced students’ (and others’) decisions to participate in the Nazi occupation of Poland and in the transfer of German and Polish populations, the actions of some of these students indicate a much deeper commitment to the Nazi cause than simply being cases of careerism or ‘academic opportunism’. Those who worked in the ‘Eastern Venture’ camps were the most involved and committed to spreading the tenets of Nazism. The young women not only helped to establish racial barriers between the Poles and the ethnic German population, but in many cases they actively participated in the use of forced labor and in the expulsion of Polish civilians from their homes and lands.

Comparatively, Hitler and Himmler’s experiment in forced migration failed due to the declining importance of the German resettlement program, relative to the decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941 and the subsequent development and implementation of a “Final Solution to the Jewish Problem.” The organizational demands and need for rail transportation to transfer troops, and later Jewish populations, to the Eastern Front left few resources for ethnic resettlement. Therefore, wide-scale resettlement ended in March, 1941. However, the actions of German students and others in supporting Polish population transfers would continue on a smaller scale until the final German expulsion from Poland in early 1945.

[1] Relatively little has been written specifically relating to German student activities in the incorporated territories. Gerhard Rempel’s Hitler’s Children: The Hitler Youth and the SS (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) devotes a chapter to student colonial activities in the east, but the work’s primary focus is on pre-college-aged students. Elizabeth Harvey’s Women and the Nazi East: Agents and Witnesses of Germanization. (Yale: Yale University Press, 2003) is a recently-published, and distressingly good, study focusing on German women’s activities in the east during the early twentieth cdentury, including their roles in the Nazification of the incorporated territories in the early 1940s. One source that I have relied upon heavily is Melitta Maschmann’s Account Rendered: A Dossier on my Former Self, Geoffrey Strachan, trans. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1964). Maschmann’s autobiographic work is the best published account that I am aware of by a German student directly involved in the ethnic resettlement process on the Eastern Front.

[2] This westernmost region of 1939 Poland, which contained the administrative center of Lodz, was alternately known as the Warthegau.

[Selected Annual Proceedings of the Florida Conference of Historians, Annual Meeting, 2004,

[3] Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1961), 35.

[4] For the ‘standard’ work on the RKFDV by which all subsequent works are judged, see: Robert Koehl, RKFDV: German Resettlement and Population Policy, 1939-1945 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

[5] Valdis Lumans. Himmler’s Auxiliaries: The Volksdeutsche Mittelstelle and the German National Minorities of Europe, 1933-1945. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1993), 161-165.

[6] Koehl, RKFDV, 100-1.

[7] Ernst Wagemann, “Geh’ nach dem Osten, junger Mann!” Schlesische Tageszeitung, 30 December, 1941, 2.

[8] See Claudia Koonz, Mothers in the Fatherland. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987).

[9] “[Intellectuals] are useless as supporting elements in a society.” “Adolf Hitlers Rede an Grossdeutschland,” Volkischer Beobachter, 10 November,1938. See also: Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, Ralph Manheim, trans. (New York: Mariner Books, 1999 [1925]), 224, 253, 331 and 431-433.

[10] Geoffrey Giles, Students and National Socialism in Germany (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 3.

[11] Melita Maschmann, Account Rendered: A Dossier on my Former Self. Geoffrey Strachan, trans. (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1964).

[12] David Bruce Furber II, “Going East: Colonialism and German Life in Nazi-Occupied Poland.” (Dissertation, University of New York, Buffalo, 2003), 191.

[13] The Institut für Deutsche Ostarbeit had been established to prove that Krakow was really a German, not a Polish, city.

[14]Giles, Students, 273-4.

[15] Ibid., 274.

[16]Adolf Hitler to Gauleiter Forster on the repopulation of the conquered eastern territories, quoted in H. R. Trevor-Roper, Hitler’s Secret Conversations, 1941-1944, Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens trans. (New York: Signet, 1961 [1953]), 442.

[17] Furber, “Going East,” 150.

[18] Ibid., 281.

[19] Fritz Spiesser, “Die Synthese: Die kleine, die große und die größere Welt,” Der koloniale Kampf, (December, 1941), 3.

[20] Maschmann, Account Rendered, 73, 76, 118

[21] Furber, “Going East,” 218, 232.

[22] Maschmann, Account Rendered, 73, 90, 93.

[23] Ibid., 92-135.

[24] Ibid., 105.

[25]Lumans, Himmler’s Auxiliaries, 234.

[26]Maschmann, Account Rendered, 104.

[27] Phillip T. Rutherford, “Race, Space and the ‘Polish Question’: Nazi Deportation Policy in Reichsgau Wartheland, 1939-1941” (Dissertation, Pennsylvania State University, 2001), 254.

[28]Maschmann. Account Rendered, 96.

[29] Ibid., 97.

[30] Ibid., 119.

[31] Ibid., 82.